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A young employee’s productivity is rarely perfectly known, and often requires a long period
of hands-on experience before being fully revealed. If an employee can be allocated to
different tasks, then the time required for her productivity to be revealed will be affected
by the employer’s choice of task allocation. For example, a young employee may be asked to
engage in a new, challenging project which, in case of success, will reveal that this employee
is highly productive. Or she may be asked to work on routine tasks, to remain idle, or to
rest, which are tasks that do not reveal information about the employee’s ability. From
the social point of view, it may be beneficial to choose tasks that reveal as fast as possible
the productivity of each worker. However, if the benefit of learning the productivity of
each worker cannot be fully captured by firms, then the equilibrium task allocation and
organizational choice is likely to be distorted toward short-run profits, possibly leading to
less-than-optimal learning.
In this paper we formalize this intuition in a model of on-the-job talent discovery. In our
model employees have an incentive to engage in tasks that generate public signals about
their abilities, even when engaging in these tasks decreases the firm’s profit. Employers
respond to these incentives by adjusting their reward schemes and corporate ’infrastructure’
to affect the opportunity costs of different tasks. Similarly to Terviö (2009), the rate of
talent discovery of young agents may be inefficiently low because, in equilibrium, fewer
young people than optimal are employed. Novel to our approach and central to our analysis,
the rate of talent discovery of agents who are employed (i.e., on-the-job talent discovery)
may also be inefficiently low, because the task allocation within the firm may be distorted.
We find that the equilibrium rate of on-the-job talent discovery – and the inefficiency
associated with it – differs across workers. In a partial equilibrium framework, we show that
a firm optimally allocates a worker to the most informative task if, and only if, both the
worker’s benefit from talent discovery and her outside option (given by the reservation
utility in the market equilibrium) are sufficiently high. The reason is that generating
information about the worker by task allocation imposes a cost on the firm. Because
of limited liability, only a worker with a high outside option can compensate for this cost
by accepting a lower wage. As a consequence, workers with a high value of talent discovery
but low market value will be either inefficiently unemployed, or employed but inefficiently
allocated to uninformative tasks. We then solve for the outside option and the benefit
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of talent discovery of each worker, and show that intermediate productivity types benefit
the most from talent discovery, but are also the most likely to be inefficiently allocated to
uninformative tasks, especially the ones close to the employability threshold.
Finally, we find that heterogeneity in employees’ career concerns translates into hetero-
geneity in firms’ organizational choices, in particular with respect to whether employees are
encouraged or discouraged to engage in activities that publicly reveal their talent. Indeed,
in our model the optimal contractual and corporate infrastructure choices change discontin-
uously in the strength of employees’ career concerns, so that small differences in employees’
type can cause large differences in firms’ organizational choices. Note that within-industry
heterogeneity in organizational form, corporate infrastructure, and contractual choice is
well-documented empirically (see, e.g., Gibbons, 2010, for a survey). Our model can there-
fore help explaining one particular dimension of this heterogeneity: the extent to which firms
encourage, tolerate, or sanction their workers’ participation in activities that reveal skills
and signal productivity, such as experimenting in new tasks, engage in difficult projects, or
competing with coworkers.1
Hence, our model predicts that some firms may allocate workers to tasks that reveal
their talent but are not profit maximizing. Evidence by Perlow and Porter (2009) suggests
that, indeed, career concerns may distort the task allocation implemented by a principal
in a way that is consistent with our prediction. They report on a four-years experiment
at several offices of the Boston Consulting Group, where “people believe that a 24/7 work
ethic is essential for getting ahead, so they work 60-plus hours a week and are slaves of their
BlackBerry.” (Perlow and Porter, 2009, p. 1). The treatment consisted in forcing people
to take time off, i.e. re-allocating time from working to idleness. Each member of the
treatment teams had to leave the office without access to email or BlackBerry for a period
of either one full day or one evening per week, depending on the version of the treatment.
The project was met with strong resistance by the consultants, who would have preferred
to continue working. The effect of the treatment was that participants reported “more open
communication, increased learning and development, and a better product delivered to the
client” (Ibid. p. 4). That is, incentives to signal talent and productivity appear to have
1 Indeed, management practices differ substantially in terms of whether firms expect and encourage over-
time work (e.g., by providing free food and a taxi home when working late), use systematic performance
monitoring, or leave employees discretion over their own task allocation. See also the cross-country evidence
collected by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).
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affected working behavior, task choice, and, ultimately, output.
To formalize our argument we use a principal-agent model. Agents’ productivities are
unknown, but their expected values are publicly observable. An agent chooses to perform
one of two tasks. One task, called a, is complex, its outcome is uncertain, and its prob-
ability of success depends on the agent’s productivity. Its outcome is publicly observable,
generating a signal about the agent’s productivity. Its expected return depends on the
state of the world, and may exceed or fall short of the expected return to the other task,
called b. Task b is routine and its outcome is independent of the agent’s productivity. We
normalize the return to task b to zero, so that this task is best interpreted as remaining
idle. In contrast, task a is best interpreted as starting a new project, initiating a merger,
or launching a marketing campaign. We allow the state of the world (and the return to
task a) to be common knowledge, or private information of the agent (i.e., the agent has
expert knowledge). In the first case, a contract conditions the task choice on the state of
the world. In the second case, a principal uses payments contingent on task choice and
investments in corporate infrastructures to affect the agent’s opportunity cost of each task.
In both cases a principal can use two types of contracts: a flexible contract, inducing the
agent to choose a task conditional on the state of the world, or a rigid contract, inducing
the agent to unconditionally choose a specific task.
Because an agent lives for two periods, choosing the visible task when young affects the
agent’s expected productivity and payoff when old. That is, agents have career concerns,
which are stronger the less informative the prior belief about their productivity. Career
concerns generate heterogeneity in contractual and organizational choice for the young.
Young agents who have high market value, high expected productivity, and thus relatively
low career concerns (“proven talents”) receive flexible contracts. These contracts implement
the profit-maximizing task choice and efficient investment. Young agents of intermediate
expected productivity (“high potentials”) have intermediate market value and derive high
value from talent discovery. Since a flexible contract that balances incentives is very costly,
a principal hiring a "high potential" uses a rigid contract implementing the visible task
regardless of its return. This regime corresponds to organizations that emphasize demon-
strating ability, e.g., by working long hours. Finally, agents with low expected productivity
and low market value but strong career concerns (“hidden gems”) receive flexible contracts.
In the first two cases, on-the-job talent discovery is efficient. For "hidden gems" in-
stead, talent discovery is inefficiently low. Using rigid instead of flexible contracts for
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"hidden gems" increases aggregate surplus, because a rigid contract generates information
regarding the agent’s productivity independently on the state of the world, while a flexible
contract generates information only in some states of the world. However, limited liability
prevents the agent from compensating the principal for the loss in expected profits caused
by switching to a rigid contract.
The logic of the model extends beyond corporate organizational choice. For example,
physicians’ salaries may depend on measures of ability such as report cards (see e.g. Kolstad,
2013, Varkevisser, van der Geest and Schut, 2012), generating incentives to signal ability.
Interestingly, some health care plans in the U.S. explicitly reward physicians for inactivity
by way of bonuses, fee withholds, and expanded capitation (see Orentlicher, 1996).2 In
addition to contracts that reward inactivity, other forms (e.g., capitation or fee-for-service)
are also widely used, generating substantial contractual heterogeneity. Our results also ex-
tend to cases in which the non-visible task is productive (see Section 5.3), such as academia.
Interpreting teaching as a non-informative task and research as a visible task, our results
suggest that young academics spend too much time teaching, which prevents them from
efficiently revealing their research skills to the market. Note also that, in line with our
predictions, universities have substantial contractual heterogeneity with respect to rewards
for teaching and research. Finally, we consider the possibility that the employer has the
same (or better) information about the payoffs of the different tasks than the employee.
This applies, for example, to professions in which physical alertness and fatigue depend on
past work load, and determine the productivity at different tasks. A case in point are plane
pilots and professional athletes, whose task allocation (i.e. when they should rest) is either
specified in the contract (for pilots), or is chosen directly by the employer (the athlete’s
club or manager). That is, if the worker does not have private information the principal
will simply enforce idleness instead of rewarding it (see Section 5.2).
The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this section discusses the relevant
literature. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework. Section 3 solves a benchmark
version of the model without limited liability. In that version, the equilibrium contractual
and organizational forms of each firm depends only on the value of talent discovery of its
worker, which is therefore efficient. Section 4 introduces limited liability and shows that
2 Bonuses, fee withholds, and expanded capitation can be described roughly as follows: if the total cost
of treatments prescribed by a physician falls short of the pre-specified amount, the physician receives a
bonus payment.
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firms will distort their contractual and organizational choice so to reduce some workers’
talent discovery below the efficient level. Section 5 discusses several extensions of the
model, and section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains all mathematical derivations that are
missing from the main text. Appendix B considers the case of large, heterogeneous firms.
1.1 Related Literature
Most closely related to our paper is the model in Terviö (2009), in which the productivity of
a young agent entering the labor market is unknown ex-ante, but is revealed once hired by
a firm. Without long-term contracts, liquidity constraints lead to less-than-efficient entry
into the labor market and inefficient discovery of the productivity of workers who are not
hired. Our paper complements this analysis by introducing talent discovery through task
allocation and organizational choice, showing that also on the job talent discovery may be
inefficient. Also close to our paper, Harstad (2007) analyzes how a firm’s organizational
choice depends on the visibility of a manager’s ability. By design firms extract the full
value of signaling and thus increase transparency and lower the manager’s compensation if
signaling increases its value. In our model, limited liability and asymmetry of information
create a wedge between the objectives of firms and workers: talent discovery (and signaling)
is inefficient.
This paper belongs to the literature on career concerns and incentives (see Gibbons and
Murphy, 1992), which has described distortions in principal-agent settings due to career con-
cerns, such as excessive or too little risk taking (Hermalin, 1993, Hirshleifer and Thakor,
1992), over-investment in or under-usage of information (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, Mil-
bourn et al., 2001), over-provision of effort (Holmström, 1999), or distorted project choice
(Holmström and Ricart i Costa, 1986, Narayanan, 1985).3 Closer to our model, Kaarbøe
and Olsen (2006) introduce career concerns in a multi-task setting a la Holmström and
Milgrom (1991) and show that the principal may use task-specific monetary incentives to
balance the agent’s career concerns. Also related is Pitchik (2008), who considers different
types of investments and shows that a worker will be biased toward self-promoting activities
– that is, investments that can be observed by outsiders. In contrast to Kaarbøe and Olsen
(2006) and Pitchik (2008) our paper focuses on the resulting inefficiency in talent discovery
3 All these papers focus on situations in which the agent has career concerns. An interesting exception
is Tamada and Tsai (2018) in which the principal has career concerns.
2 The Model 7
and organizational heterogeneity. Canidio and Legros (2017) also consider a multi-task set-
ting with career concerns. They argue that inefficient on-the-job task allocation and talent
discovery may induce workers to become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs may earn less than
workers of equivalent characteristics, but they have full control on their task choice, and
can efficiently choose task that reveal their talent.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on productivity-enhancing investment or
non-monetary rewards such as perks. Perks have been interpreted as non-monetary re-
muneration substituting for cash payments (see, e.g., Rosen, 1986). Here, we argue that
perks are both a form of remuneration and a way to affect an employee’s optimal task
choice. Perks have also been described as arising from managerial discretionary power over
free cash flow (see, e.g., Jensen, 1986, Bebchuk and Fried, 2009, Rajan and Wulf, 2006).
By contrast, in our setup the principal decides on the provision of perks, which are then
enjoyed by the agent, as part of an optimal incentive system. Finally, previous work has
examined the use of perks to create incentives for workers (see, e.g., Kvaløy and Schöttner,
2015, Marino and Zábojník, 2008, Oyer, 2008), but has focused mainly on a single-task
environment, remaining silent on issues of tailoring corporate investments to task choice.
Heterogeneity of organizational forms and productivities is also a result in Gibbons,
Holden and Powell (2012) and Legros and Newman (2013). In both papers, the output
price determines firms’ organizational choices, which in turn affect the price. In Gibbons,
Holden and Powell (2012) the market price conveys a signal about the aggregate state of the
world, which leads some firms to choose organizational forms that generate information and
others to free-ride on the information contained in the market price. In Legros and Newman
(2013), the market price determines the severity of nontransferabilities within firms, which
in turn determine ownership choices. Heterogeneity in ownership is necessary to generate
a continuous aggregate supply function and guarantees the existence of the competitive
equilibrium. Our paper complements their analysis, exploring the heterogeneity in the
choices of corporate infrastructure and labor contracts in response to career concerns.
2 The Model
2.1 Agents
An economy is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous agents i ∈ I and a continuum
of identical principals j ∈ J . Both agents and principals are endowed with measure 1.
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Agents are born with zero wealth, live for two periods denoted by τ ∈ {y; o}, and are
heterogeneous in their productivity type p ∈ {p; p} with 0 < p < p < 1. Productivity
is unobservable to both agents and principals. All agents and principals share the same
belief about each agent’s productivity. Young agents’ are heterogeneous in their expected
productivity, denoted by
p̃ = E[p|τ = y].
The expectation p̃ is best interpreted as credentials generated at an un-modeled earlier
stage, e.g., grades at school. Denote an old agent’s expected productivity by
p̃o = E[p|τ = o],
For any agent, p̃o depends on p̃ and on the work performance in the first period of life. We
assume that young agents do not discount future payoffs.
2.2 Production
Principals and agents jointly generate output in firms of size 2 (see section 5.4 for an
extension to greater firm sizes). Setting up a firm requires a fixed cost F . In a firm the
agent works on one of two tasks d ∈ {a, b}. Task b is a routine task yielding revenue 0 for the
principal.4 In contrast, task a is complex and may be completed successfully (S) or result
in a failure (F ). The probability of success in task a is given by the agent’s productivity p.
Our main assumption is that the revenues generated in case of success or failure depend
on a firm- and period-specific state of the world s ∈ {A,B}, with pr(s = A) = q and
pr(s = B) = 1 − q. Hence, task a is best interpreted as starting a new project, such as
developing a new product, which requires the principal to commit some of the company’s
resources. These resources will be lost if the agent fails. If instead the agent succeeds,
the product is launched. This setup allows for the interesting case where revenues are
maximized by task a in state A and by task b in state B. Call the revenue in case of success
R(s) and the revenue in case of failure R(s) < R(s). Let R(s, p) = pR(s) + (1 − p)R(s)
denote the expected revenue in state s given productivity p. We assume that
R(A, p) > 0 ≥ R(B, p) for all p ∈ {p; p}. (A1)
4 This extreme case, where b is unproductive and uninformative (i.e., staying idle) effectively illustrates
our main point: career concerns generate diversity in organizational choice and may lead firms to reward
idleness. Our results carry over qualitatively when the revenue from task b is positive, see Section 5.3.
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This assumption captures situations in which the product may flop and fail to break even,
quality problems may hurt the firm’s reputation, or design flaws may trigger legal actions
and fines.
For most of what follows we assume that the state of the world is the agent’s private
information.5 That is, the agent has expert knowledge about the expected profitability of
task a (e.g., a manager with private knowledge about the profitability of a restructuring).6
For ease of exposition, suppose that the agent has full information about the state s, while
the principal only knows the prior. Finally, success and failure are publicly revealed at the
end of each period, as in Harris and Holmström (1982).
2.3 Corporate Investments in Infrastructure
When performing a given task, an agent incurs a task-specific utility cost cd. As in Oyer
(2008), the principal’s investments, denoted by ka and kb, can affect this cost:
cb(kb) = −kb and ca(ka) = c− ka.
ka represents investment in corporate infrastructure complementary to production, such
as office space, powerful computers, and high quality furniture, which will be referred to
as A capital. In contrast, kb is investment in corporate infrastructure complementary to
idleness, such as swimming pools, climbing walls and game rooms, which will be referred
to as B capital. Note that ka and kb may capture investments in corporate culture, which
determine, for instance, the extent to which an agent’s successful performance is rewarded
by social esteem. The cost of either investment is convex, and given by (k2a + k2b )/2 for
notational convenience. Let
c > q. (A2)
This assumption guarantees that, when investment in A capital is efficient, performing task
a is costly for the agent. Finally, suppose that the setup cost F is high enough to render
idle firms unprofitable in the sense that the total surplus is negative if the agent chooses
task b with certainty: F ≥ 1/2.
5 Section 5.2 considers the case of common knowledge, in which the choice over task allocation can be
delegated to the principal.
6 Note that this case is also consistent with interpreting s as the agent’s physical state (which, for instance,
may reflect health or alertness) if the agent has private information about it, conditional on all observables
such as previous workload.
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2.4 Contractual Environment and Payoffs
As agents have no wealth, contracts must respect limited liability and payments be non-
negative. Task choice and the outcome of task a are publicly observable and contractible,
but revenue and the state of the world are not verifiable at the time of wage payments. It
follows that a contract specifies the principal’s investments (ka, kb) and payments wd ≥ 0
contingent on tasks d = {a, b}.7 Individuals can only sign short-term contracts. Contracts
may condition on an agent’s age.
Hence, in each period a matched agent obtains payoff u = wb + kb if the task chosen
was b and u = wa− c+ ka if it was a. Correspondingly, a principal’s payoff is π = −wb− κ
if task b was chosen and E[π] = R(s, p̃)− wa − κ otherwise, where κ = F + (k2a + k2b )/2.
2.5 Timing of Events
In each period events in this economy unfold as follows:
1. Principals and agents match in a frictionless labor market, and sign binding short-
term contracts.
2. Principals invest as specified in the contract.
3. Within each match (i, j), a state of the world s ∈ {A,B} is realized.
4. The agent chooses task a or task b.
5. Successes and failures at task a are realized, revenue accrues, and payments are made.
A labor market equilibrium is an individually rational, stable allocation of pairs of one
principal and one agent, such that there is no pair of principal and agent who can obtain
a strictly higher joint payoff if they match and sign a contract of the form (ka, kb, wa, wb).
In each period t a measure 1 of principals competes for a measure 1 of agents, with mea-
sure 1/2 of young and old agents each. Suppose that the distribution of young agents’
7 Conditioning wages on success or failure will not change the analysis, since expected payoffs conditional
on task choice fully determine incentives and agents are risk-neutral. Our results will also remain unchanged
if the state is contractible, because under limited liability the principal cannot impose a negative transfer
on the agent, so that she will still reward task b to prevent the agent from choosing task a in state B.
Finally, we note that assuming that the principal can prescribe task choice directly would not affect our
analysis, because the incentive compatibility constraint in a rigid contract will not bind.
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expected productivities p̃ has full support on [p, p]. This assumption suffices to guarantee
the stationarity of the labor market.
3 A Constrained Efficient Benchmark
We start by examining a simplified version of the model without imposing limited liability,
i.e., payments wa and wb can be negative. We will show that investments and task choice
depend only on agents’ career concerns (and not on their market value) and are therefore
efficient conditional on these concerns. This case thus serves as an efficient benchmark,
corresponding to the allocation chosen by a social planner who maximizes aggregate utility
but cannot observe agents’ productivities.8 Furthermore, the simplification allows to illus-
trate the mechanism at work without the additional complication of nontransferable utility
induced by limited liability, which is examined in Section 4 below.
We distinguish between a rigid contract implementing task a independently of the state
of the world and a flexible contract implementing task a in state A and task b in state
B.9 Thus a rigid contract generates a signal about a worker’s type in every state of the
world, while a flexible contract only does so in state A. We show that in this constrained
efficient benchmark young agents of intermediate productivity type benefit the most from
generating information and are therefore given a rigid contract if hired. All other workers
are instead given a flexible contract, which is the contract maximizing output in each period.
Investments in ka and kb depend only on the type of contract offered, so that any two agents
both receiving a rigid (or a flexible) contract enjoy the same level of non-monetary benefits.
3.1 Old Agents
We examine the case of an old agent first, because the expected payoffs when old will
determine the career concerns when young. Consider a principal matched with an agent
p̃o who has outside option u∗o(p̃o) (which we will derive endogenously below). In a flexible
8 In a first best, when agents’ productivities are observable, there are neither career concerns nor con-
tractual and organizational heterogeneity.
9 A contract implementing task b independently of the state of the world yields negative surplus as
F > 1/2. A contract implementing task a in state B and task b in state A generates negative expected
surplus because of Assumption A1.
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contract incentive compatibility requires the agent to be indifferent between tasks a and b:
wa − c+ ka = wb + kb.
The participation constraint is
q(wa − c+ ka) + (1− q)(wb + kb) ≥ u∗o(p̃o).
Incentive compatibility implies that the payoffs in each state have to be individually ra-
tional: wb + kb ≥ u∗o(p̃o) and wa − c + ka ≥ u∗o(p̃o).10 The principal’s expected payoff
is
π = q(R(A, p̃o)− wa)− (1− q)wb − (k2a + k2b )/2− F. (1)
As the principal’s payoff decreases in wa, wb, ka and kb, the participation constraint has to
bind and
wb + kb = u
∗
o(p̃o) = wa − c+ ka.
That is, payments are wa = u∗o(p̃o) + c− ka and wb = u∗o(p̃o)− kb. Using this result on (1)
yields
π = q(R(A, p̃o)− c+ ka) + (1− q)kb − (k2a + k2b )/2− F − u∗o(p̃o).
Therefore, investment choices ka = q and kb = 1 − q maximize both the principal’s payoff
conditional on the agent’s outside option u∗o(p̃o) and the joint payoff.
Consider now a rigid contract. Incentive compatibility and individual rationality require
wa − c+ ka ≥ wb + kb and wa − c+ ka ≥ u∗o(p̃o),
respectively. The principal’s expected payoff is
π = qR(A, p̃o) + (1− q)R(B, p̃o)− c− wa − wb − (k2a + k2b )/2− F. (2)
To maximize π, the principal chooses kb = 0 and wb = 0, and the participation constraint
must bind. Using this on (2) implies that ka = 1, which also maximizes the joint payoff of
principal and agent. The wage for task a is then wa = u∗o(p̃o) + c− 1.
10 Note that we omit stating an explicit interim participation constraint, because it is satisfied by design,
since neither for rigid nor for flexible contracts will the agent’s payoff depend on the realization of the state.
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Inspecting the payoffs of a principal and an old agent, a flexible contract Pareto dom-
inates a rigid one if R(B, p̃o) − (c − q) < 0, which is implied by Assumptions A1 and A2.
The joint payoff under a flexible contract is positive only if
p̃o ≥




That is, p̄∗o denotes the minimum productivity required by a principal hiring an old agent
with u∗o(p̃o) = 0. Suppose that a flexible contract with efficient investments is profitable for
old agents with high productivity p, but not for those with low productivity p:
R(A, p) < c− q + 1 + F/q − 1/(2q) < R(A, p). (A3)
Therefore old agents with p̃o < p̄∗o remain unmatched and productive agents are scarce.
Hence, principals compete for agents who can generate positive expected output, and obtain




q(R(A, p̃o)− c) + q
2+(1−q)2
2 − F if p̃o ≥ p̄∗o,
0 if p̃o < p̄∗o,
(3)
3.2 Career Concerns
In contrast to old agents young agents have career concerns, because failing or succeeding
at task a provides an informative signal about their productivity. Consider a young agent
with expected productivity p̃. Denote the posterior expectation of p̃ by pI(p̃) if the agent
remained idle in period 1, by pF (p̃) if the agent failed at task a, and by pS(p̃) if the agent
succeeded. Applying Bayes’s formula yields the following statement.
Lemma 1. An old agent’s expected productivity is pS(p̃) = p + p − p pp̃ after task a was
successfully completed, pF (p̃) =
p̃(1−p−p)+pp
1−p̃ after a failure to complete task a, and pI(p̃) = p̃
otherwise.
Clearly pF (p̃) < pI(p̃) = p̃ < pS(p̃). Denote by s∗(p̃) the value of the signal generated by
a young agent with expected productivity p̃ in task a. Because individuals are risk neutral,
the signal value is given by
s∗(p̃) = p̃u∗o(pS(p̃)) + (1− p̃)u∗o(pF (p̃))− u∗o(p̃). (4)
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Recall that an old agent’s equilibrium payoff u∗o(p̃o) (given by 3) is increasing, is piecewise
linear, and has a kink at p̄∗o. It follows that
s∗(p̃) =

p̃u∗o(pS(p̃)) if p̃ ≤ p̄∗o < pS(p̃)
p̃u∗o(pS(p̃))− u∗o(p̃) if pF (p̃) < p̄∗o < p̃
0 otherwise.
Hence, s∗(p̃) ≥ 0 for all p̃ ∈ [p; p], strictly increases on p̃ < p̄∗o < pS(p̃), and strictly decreases
on pF (p̃) < p̄∗o < p̃, implying that s∗(p̄∗o) > 0. That is, generating a public signal has a
positive value for agents with productivity p̃ in the neighborhood of p̄∗o.
Note that this result holds also if the agents are averse to risk. While the value of
generating a public signal decreases in the degree of risk aversion, it is always positive in
the neighborhood of p̄∗o. As the results derived below depend only on a strictly positive
signal value s∗(p̃) for some p̃, they will not change qualitatively by introducing risk aversion.
3.3 Young Agents
The contractual choice for young agents will respond to career concerns. We start again
with a flexible contract. Incentive compatibility and individual rationality require
wa + s
∗(p̃)− c+ ka = wb + kb and q(wa + s∗(p̃)− c+ ka) + (1− q)(wb + kb) ≥ u∗y(p̃),
where u∗y(p̃) denotes the agent’s outside option. The principal’s payoff is
π = q(R(A, p̃)− wa)− (1− q)wb − (k2a + k2b )/2− F. (5)
Similar to the case of old agents, investments will be chosen efficiently, ka = q and kb = 1−q.
Associated payments are wa = c+ u∗y(p̃)− q − s∗(p̃) and wb = u∗y(p̃)− (1− q).
For a rigid contract incentive compatibility and individual rationality require
wa + s
∗(p̃)− c+ ka ≥ wb + kb and wa + s∗(p̃)− c+ ka ≥ u∗y(p̃).
The principal’s payoff is
π = qR(A, p̃) + (1− q)R(B, p̃)− wa − (k2a + k2b )/2− F.
Also here kb = 0, wb = 0, ka = 1 and wa = u∗y(p̃) + c− s∗(p̃)− 1. Note that career concerns
lower the monetary payment to a young agent, reducing the cost of using a rigid contract.
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Therefore young agents require less remuneration than old agents of the same produc-
tivity for a given outside option, especially if they expect to be allocated to task a with
certainty. It follows that a rigid contract may Pareto dominate a flexible one for a young
agent, if the signal value s∗(p̃) is sufficiently high. Furthermore, young agents are employed
at lower productivity than old agents, because young agents with expected productivity
in the neighborhood of p̄∗o value the signal generated by task a, which partly compensates
their effort cost c. The following proposition states these results.
Proposition 1 (Benchmark Equilibrium Allocation). Old agents with p̃o are matched and
receive a flexible contract if p̃o ≥ p̄∗o > 0, and remain unmatched otherwise. Their equilib-
rium payoffs uo(p̃o) are given by (3).
Young agents with p̃ derive positive value from generating a signal, s∗(p̃) ≥ 0, with
s∗(p̃) > 0 for p̃ in the neighborhood of p̄∗o. They are matched to a principal if p̃ ≥ p̄∗y with
p̄∗y < p̄
∗
o. They receive a flexible contract if c − q − s∗(p̃) ≥ R(B, p̃) and a rigid contract
otherwise. Young agents with p̃ < p̄∗y remain unmatched.
The equilibrium allocation maximizes aggregate surplus.
To assess whether rigid contracts are used in the benchmark equilibrium and, if so, who
uses them, we note that s∗(p̃) converges to 0 as p̃ approaches p and that flexible contracts
are used for high productivity agents. Using that s∗(p̃) attains a maximum at p̄∗o we derive
the following statement, details are in the appendix.
Proposition 2 (Benchmark Organizational Choice). Suppose that R(B) and R(B) are
sufficiently high and c sufficiently low. Then there are thresholds p̄∗y ≤ p∗1 < p∗2 < p such
that the optimal contract for a young agent is
(i) flexible for p̄∗y ≤ p̃ ≤ p∗1,
(ii) rigid for p∗1 ≤ p̃ ≤ p∗2,
(iii) flexible for p∗2 ≤ p̃ ≤ p.
If q ≥ 1/2, the break-even young agent receives a rigid contract, i.e. p̄∗y = p∗1. Else, the
break-even young agent receives a flexible contract, i.e. p̄∗y < p∗1.
That is, if the cost of choosing task a is sufficiently low (both in terms of direct disutility
c and output loss R(B, p̃) = p̃R(B) + (1 − p̃)R(B)), then career concerns can generate
organizational and contractual heterogeneity in firms that employ young agents.
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4 Labor Market Equilibrium with Limited Liability
We now turn to the equilibrium behavior of principals and agents when contracts have to
respect limited liability (i.e., wa, wb ≥ 0). Compared with the benchmark above, now the
equilibrium contract and investment levels received by an agent may depend on his market
value. Therefore investments may be distorted downwards simply because the agent cannot
pay for them. More subtly, for young agents who receive a flexible contract, the mix of
investments may be biased towards B capital to compensate for the signal value. That is,
idleness may be rewarded by means of corporate investment. As a consequence a young
agent is less likely to work on task a than in the benchmark, especially if he has low
market value, leading to less-than-optimal talent discovery. In addition, organizational
heterogeneity emerges within each contractual regime, as the optimal investment changes
with the worker’s outside option. Finally, a firm’s preferred contractual regime may change
multiple times as p̃ increases.
To solve for the optimal contract, we consider again a pair of principal and agent with
given outside option and signal value (here denoted by uy(p̃), uo(p̃o) and s(p̃)), which will
later be derived endogenously as the market equilibrium payoffs.
4.1 Old Agents
As above we start with the case of old agents, for whom the signal value is zero. Using an
analogous approach as above (see appendix for details) we derive the following statement.
Proposition 3. In a match of a principal and an old agent a flexible contract is preferred
to a rigid contract under assumptions A1 and A2. An old agent is hired if, and only if
q(R(A, p̃o)− c) + (q2 + (1− q)2)/2− F ≥ uo(p̃o) if uo(p̃o) ≥ 1− q,
q(R(A, p̃o)− c) + q2/2− F ≥ q · uo(p̃o) + uo(p̃o)2/2 if uo(p̃o) < 1− q.
Corporate investments ka and kb coincide with the benchmark if uo(p̃o) ≥ 1− q, otherwise
there is under-investment in kb.
As in the benchmark old agents are employed only if their expected productivity is
high enough, and flexible dominate rigid contracts under Assumptions A1 and A2. By
contrast, limited liability distorts investments that are not needed to compensate the agent
for effort or opportunity cost, i.e. investment in B capital for low outside options uo(p̃o) <
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1− q. Hence, the minimum break-even productivity is now higher than in the benchmark.
Agents who generate positive surplus remain scarce, so that principals obtain zero profit in
equilibrium, determining old agents’ equilibrium outside option.
Proposition 4. In a labor market equilibrium, all old agents with expected productivity
p̃o ≥ p̄o are employed and obtain flexible contracts, where
p̄o =
c− q/2 + F/q −R(A)
R(A)−R(A) > p̄
∗
o > p. (6)
There is p̂o > p̄o, such that investments are efficient if p̃o ≥ p̂o. In equilibrium principals
obtain payoffs π = 0 and old agents obtain payoffs
uo(p̃o) =

q(R(A, p̃o)− c) + q
2+(1−q)2
2 − F if p̃o ≥ p̂o,√
2q(R(A, p̃o)− c+ q)− 2F − q if p̄o < p̃o < p̂o,
0 if p̃o < p̄o.
(7)
In other words, under limited liability unemployment is higher than in the benchmark,
and the payoffs of intermediate productivity types’ are lower.
4.2 Career Concerns
As above, old agents’ payoffs (7) determine a young agent’s signal value s(p̃):
s(p̃) =

p̃uo(pS(p̃)) if p̃ < p̄o < pS(p̃),
p̃uo(pS(p̃))− uo(p̃) if pF (p̃) < p̄o < p̃,
p̃uo(pS(p̃)) + (1− p̃)uo(pF (p̃))− uo(p̃) if p̄o < pF (p̃) < p̂o,
0 otherwise.
Note here that, in contrast to the benchmark, s(p̃) may be negative, because old agents’
payoffs are a concave function of p̃o for p̄o < p̃o < p̂o. Differentiating uo(p̃o), pS(.), and
pF (.) implies the following properties.
Lemma 2 (Signal Value). Given old agents’ equilibrium payoffs, the signal value s(p̃)
(i) is strictly positive and strictly increases for p p/(p+ p+ p̄o) < p̃ < p̄o,
(ii) strictly decreases for p̄o < p̃ < (p̄o − pp)/(1− p− p− p̄o),
(iii) increases for p̃ > max{p̄o, (p̄o − pp)/(1− p− p− p̄o)}.





























Fig. 1: Old agents’ payoffs and young agents’ signal value in equilibrium (solid lines) and
benchmark (dashed lines).
Figure 1 illustrates Lemma 2 and compares the equilibrium signal value to the bench-
mark signal value (i.e. the signal value without limited liability). Indeed the signal value
increases for low p̃, decreases for intermediate p̃ and increases again for sufficiently high p̃.
4.3 Young Agents
The contracting problem of a principal and a young agent with expected productivity p̃ is
complicated both by limited liability and career concerns. The following lemma derives the
choice of contract for given signal value s(p̃) and outside option uy(p̃).
Lemma 3. There exists a function û(p̃) > 0 and a function ŝ(u), such that a young agent
with expected productivity p̃ receives a rigid contract if, and only if, uy(p̃) ≥ û(p̃) and
s(p̃) ≥ ŝ(uy(p̃)). Corporate investments in A and B capital maximize the joint surplus
given contractual choice if uy(p̃) ≥ q, and uy(p̃) ≥ 1− q, respectively.
That is, rigid contracts are used for young agents with strong career concerns and high
outside options. High outside options are necessary to make rigid contracts preferable under
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limited liability, because the agent needs to compensate the principal for the decrease in
expected revenue (R(B, p̃) instead of 0) through a lower wage. All other agents receive
flexible contracts. Career concerns bias the agent toward the visible task a. A flexible
contract balances against this bias by making task a relatively more costly than b, using
an appropriate mix of investments and monetary incentives. For young agents with low
outside options, the provision of B capital satisfies the participation constraint. To ensure
incentive compatibility the principal then optimally biases investments toward B capital.
Corporate investments are equal for both contract types (ka + kb = 1) for high outside
options, and higher under flexible contracts for low outside options.
Interpreting the outside option as an agent’s market value, Lemma 3 allows us to tie
contractual and organizational choice to an agent’s characteristics. High potentials (who
have both high market and high signal value) receive rigid contracts that discourage idleness
and emphasize task a. Corporate investment focuses on A capital. Hidden gems (who have
low market but high signal value) receive flexible contracts and corporate investments are
distorted to discourage signal generation on the job. Organizations may efficiently invest in
B capital while under-investing in A capital. Such organizations emphasize the possibility of
staying idle and discourage employees from activities that generate public signals. Finally,
proven talents (who have low signal value) receive flexible contracts. Idleness is tolerated
but not explicitly rewarded. Investment in A capital is efficient, and B capital is used to
reward the agent but not to affect task choice.
4.4 Equilibrium Organizational Choice
Next we determine the equilibrium organizational and contractual choice. First, we estab-
lish that π = 0 for all i, and use this fact to derive a young agent’s equilibrium payoff uy(p̃).
Next we show that uy(p̃) strictly increases in p̃, and that there is a threshold productivity
level, above which young agents are employed. This yields the following statement.
Lemma 4. There is p̄y such that all young agents with p̃ ≥ p̄y are hired by a principal. For
p̃ close to p̄y the contract received is flexible. Young agents are hired at lower productivity
levels than old agents: p̄y < p̄o. Their payoff uy(p̃) strictly increases for p̃ ≥ p̄y.
As in the benchmark model, young agents are employed at lower productivity levels
than old agents. By contrast, the marginal young agent (with p̃ close to p̄y) receives a
flexible contract, independent of his signal value. The reason is that under limited liability
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a young agent has no means to compensate the principal for the expected loss generated
by working on task a in state B. Hence, the agent will be given a flexible contract even
when the benefit of talent discovery is very high.
We now turn to the organizational choice of firms hiring young workers with productivity
above p̄y. By Lemma 3 young agents obtain rigid contracts, if they have both sufficient
equilibrium payoff uy(p̃) and signal value s(p̃). Both are endogenous and depend on each
other in equilibrium, since the signal value is part of a young agent’s payoff. By Lemma 3 a
rigid contract is chosen for high enough payoff uy(p̃), if the signal value exceeds a threshold
ŝ(uy(p̃)). This threshold decreases in p̃, since uy(p̃) strictly increases. Due to the shape of
s(p̃) there may be several intersection points (see Lemma 2) and the optimal organizational
choice may switch back and forth between flexible and rigid contracts as p̃ increases from p̄y
to p. Rigid contracts may be used for intermediate productivity workers, while the most and
least productive workers receive a flexible contract, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Labor Market Outcome). In a labor market equilibrium, old agents obtain
flexible contracts if p̃o ≥ p̄o and are unemployed otherwise, and young agents obtain flexible
or a rigid contracts if p̃ ≥ p̄y and are unemployed otherwise.
If R(B) and R(B) are sufficiently high and c sufficiently low, then there are thresholds
py < p1 < p2 ≤ p3 < p4 < p such that the optimal contract for a young agent is:
(i) flexible for p̄y < p̃ < p1 with wa = 0, 0 < ka ≤ q, and 0 < kb ≤ 1− q,
(ii) rigid for p1 < p̃ < p2 and p3 < p̃ < p4 with wa ≥ 0, q < ka ≤ 1, and kb = 0,
(iii) flexible for p3 < p̃ < p with wa > 0, and ka = q, and 0 < kb ≤ 1− q.
As in the benchmark without limited liability some young agents will be given a rigid
contract, if the cost of choosing task a (measured by R(B, p̃) = p̃R(B) + (1− p̃)R(B) and
c) is sufficiently low. In this case, for young agents with low productivity, p̄y < p̃ < p1,
career concerns are strong, but the associated market payoff is low. In contrast to the
benchmark case now these agents receive flexible contracts with under-investment in ka
used to discourage task a (i.e. the hidden gems mentioned above). Young agents with
p1 < p̃ < p2 are high potentials, with strong career concerns and intermediate market
values, and obtain a rigid contract. This contract may take the extreme form of ka < 1 and
wa = wb = 0, which is reminiscent of unpaid internships that are common, for example,
in journalism. Finally, young agents with high productivity have weak career concerns and
high market value. Thus, proven talents obtain flexible contracts with efficient investment

























Fig. 2: Contractual and organizational choice depending on expected productivity p̃.
in ka and possibly in kb. Figure 2 summarizes these points and shows the signal value
threshold ŝ(.), which determines the different regimes.
Contracts for agents with p̄y < p̃ < p̄o are an extreme form of discouraging work and
rewarding idleness, especially when uy(p̄o) > 1 − q, since then wb > 0, but wa = 0. Such
a contract pays a wage only if the agent remains idle, but if the agent remains idle she
will be unemployed when old. If the agent chooses task a and generates a signal, no wage
is paid and the agent will either move up to a better contract with a potentially different
employer, or move out and remain unemployed.
Finally, there is organizational heterogeneity across generations. Figure 3 depicts the
equilibrium corporate infrastructure investment for old and young agents at different pro-
ductivity levels. As in the benchmark model, for young agents the investment is discontin-
uous whenever the contractual regime changes. A young agent receiving a flexible contract
enjoys higher kb (e.g., sports facilities or game rooms) and lower ka (e.g., office equipment
or corporate jets) relative to an old agent with the same productivity. Young agents who
receive rigid contracts enjoy lower kb than old agents with the same productivity. Therefore
the composition of corporate investment differs substantially across generations, even when





















Fig. 3: Investment in ka and kb, for given agent’s productivity and age.
young and old workers have the same productivity and receive the same contract type.
4.5 Welfare
Limited liability affects social welfare through two channels. On the one hand, limited
liability reduces the productivity of old agents (through distortions in infrastructure in-
vestment), which affects the signal value of young agents. On the other hand, limited
liability distorts contractual and organizational choice for young agents given the signal
value. Both channels operate through organizational choice, i.e., corporate infrastructure
investments and contractual environments. The relation between the market equilibrium
and the constrained efficient benchmark derived in Section 3 can be summarized as follows.
Corollary 1. Compared to the constrained efficient allocation, in the market equilibrium
with limited liability
(i) fewer old agents and fewer young agents are employed,
(ii) corporate investments are distorted for old agents with intermediate types,
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(iii) flexible instead of rigid contracts are used for some young agents with intermediate
types. Corporate investments for these agents are distorted toward B capital.
That is, too few young workers are employed, implying that their productivity is not
revealed. Moreover, the least productive among the employed workers receive rigid instead
of flexible contracts. For these agents too little information is revealed compared to the
constrained optimum, as a signal is generated only in state A. Therefore the equilibrium
outcome is characterized by too much idleness and too little talent discovery.
5 Discussion
5.1 Outcome Observability
In our model outcomes of tasks are publicly observable. Of course, in practice principals
may attempt to obfuscate successes of their employees as to reduce the value of choosing the
visible task. However, in many cases making output more or less visible involves a change
in the worker’s task assignment. For example, in order to obfuscate output, a principal may
prevent a worker from attending meetings with clients or other firms, and instead assign
him to other tasks. Hence, the choice between different degrees of output visibility can be
formalized as a choice between different tasks. Our central trade off will remain as an agent
will still be biased towards tasks that are inherently more visible and whose outcomes are
costlier to conceal.
5.2 If the Agent Is Not an Expert
If the state of the world is observed by agents, principals, and third parties, contracts can
specify a task contingent on the state. Therefore flexible contracts will not need to satisfy
incentive compatibility for the agent. That is, in a flexible contract investments in B capital
and monetary rewards for task b will not need to equalize the payoffs across states. Hence,
under symmetric information, in case of a flexible contract investments ka and kb are chosen
at the efficient ratio ka/kb = q/(1− q) and joint surplus for a given productivity is greater
than under asymmetric information. On the other hand, symmetry of information has
no impact on the investment choice (and surplus) under a rigid contract. Hence, flexible
contracts are used more frequently than in the case of asymmetric information. It follows
that equilibrium on-the-job talent discovery and welfare are lower when the agent is not an
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expert (i.e., symmetric information about the state of the world) then when the agent is an
expert (i.e., the agent has private information about the state of the world).
5.3 If the Routine Task b is Productive
If task b yields a positive return r > 0 with R(A, p̃) > r > R(B, p̃), the analysis derived
above carries over qualitatively. A rigid contract will now be more costly but will still be
chosen if the signal value is high enough relative to r − R(b, p̃). The main difference from
the results above is that young agents with low expected productivity (the ones that are
left unmatched when r = 0) are assigned to rigid contracts implementing the non-visible
task b, which allows us to interpret our setup as a labor market with routine and complex
occupations.
One industry that this type of equilibrium describes well may be academia, when teach-
ing is interpreted as the non-visible task b, and research corresponds to the visible task
a. The organizational and contractual choices for entry positions differ markedly across
departments. Some departments favor organizational and contractual designs that primar-
ily encourage task b (teaching) while relying on market incentives for task a (i.e. research
output). Other departments appear to favor the exact opposite by encouraging research
over teaching, using bonus payments for publications (but not for teaching), and providing
large research budgets. The organizational structure in a third group seems to explicitly
encourage both tasks. Our model suggest that, compared to the benchmark, in equilibrium
young faculty may spend too much time teaching and not enough time doing research.
5.4 Firm Sizes
The assumption that firms consist of pairs of principals and agents can easily be extended to
multiple agents per firm. If corporate investments can be tailored to each agent the problem
is identical to the one studied above. If corporate investments apply to the whole firm, our
results carry over qualitatively when states are drawn independently across agents, and
when each agent’s revenues depend exclusively on their own success or failure. In this case
a firm’s optimal investment depends on the menu of contracts used, and the organizational
structure within an industry changes discontinuously in the employees’ average productivity
as above (see Appendix B). In addition, if firms are not constrained by technology in
choosing the workforce composition, they will tend to hire homogeneous workers and choose
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the corresponding optimal organizational form (see, e.g., Gall, 2010, for a matching market
model with heterogeneous agents and principals, and endogenous firm sizes).
5.5 Technological Change
Technological change may have an interesting effect on the dynamics of the labor market
if different productivity types are affected differentially: i.e. if technological change is skill
biased. A simple way to model this effect is to allow the top productivity p to increase.
As a consequence, old agents’ market values increase and the wage schedule for old agents
becomes more convex.
This change increases the value of choosing the visible task for young agents, which,
in turn, increases the desirability of rigid contracts and exacerbates under-investment in
A capital. This effect is partially compensated for by an increase in young agents’ market
values as expected surplus increases due to technological change. That is, a shock that
affects only some type of agents may generate substantial reorganization of all firms.
5.6 Dynamics
When moving from a two-period model to a multi-period model, the pattern described
above largely carries over. As in Gibbons and Murphy (1992), the value of choosing action
a decreases over the lifetime of an agent, reflecting the diminishing net present value of
future earnings and the value of success as the agent grows older. In turn, this decline
implies that the expected productivity of the marginal agent (who generates an expected
joint surplus of 0) increases with an agent’s age. Hence, the organizational choice described
above functions as a screening mechanism that becomes increasingly demanding as agents
grow older. In addition, the model predicts that within a given cohort, the use of rigid
contracts and organizational heterogeneity decrease over time.
6 Conclusions
This paper has examined the organizational response of firms to the career concerns of
agents. Our main assumption is that different tasks are differentially informative depending
on the agents’ talent. We show that firms that employ similar types of agents may optimally
choose very different organizational forms, such as one that rewards idleness or one that
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rewards conspicuous activities. This is because tasks that generate public signals about the
agent’s productivity may impose a cost on the principal, and rewarding idleness discourages
the agent from choosing such tasks. However, if the agent values generating public signals
enough, the principal may find that discouraging the agent is too costly. The results are
consistent with the observed heterogeneity in firms’ provision of employee perks, reward
schemes and management practices such as encouraging or discouraging overtime work.
In the labor market equilibrium, three different regimes of organizational choice can
emerge: hidden gems (agents close to break-even productivity) receive flexible contracts
that balance career concerns by rewarding idleness, but corporate investments are under-
provided as a result of limited liability. This situation reflects a market failure because
the surplus maximizing organization choice absent limited liability encourages talent dis-
covery by mean of rigid contracts. High potentials (agents of intermediate productivities)
receive rigid contracts encouraging visible activities and discouraging idleness. Proven tal-
ents (agents of high productivity) have weak career concerns and receive flexible contracts,
where career concerns are balanced using monetary payments, and corporate infrastructure
investments are efficient.
To derive the results in a tractable manner, we opted for simplicity rather than gener-
ality. For instance, principals are homogeneous. An extension could consider heterogeneity
among employers, implying that the optimal task choice and organizational form will depend
on the attributes of both principal and agent. This modification would entail specialization
among principals, with some engaging in talent discovery and others in rewarding idleness.
The distribution of principals would determine the degree of social learning and the distri-
bution of types in the supply of older agents, generating interesting policy implications.
The model has implications for the analysis of job turnover and internal labor markets.
Performing the visible task generates a public signal and thus an update of the agent’s
expected productivity. This signal also changes the organizational setup for the agent in
the following period (i.e., when the agent changes jobs). Thus, a rigid contract can be
interpreted as an ’up or out’ work environment, where employees are either promoted or
fired. A flexible contract allows for the possibility that an agent stays idle and remains
in the organization in the following period. That is, turnover is lower in firms that invest
more in B capital.
Finally, our model has direct policy implications. As emphasised in the existing liter-
ature (see Terviö, 2009), the rate of talent discovery depends on whether a young agent
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is hired. In addition, and novel to our framework, once hired the rate of talent discovery
depends on the task this agent is allocated to. Policies that subsidize hiring young workers—
possibly at the efficient level—may therefore still fail to achieve the first best, unless they
also distort the type of contracts offered by firms and the resulting task allocation.
A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1










Using p̃ = τp + (1 − τ)p yields the expression in the lemma. An analogous argument
yields pF (p̃). If an agent chose task b or remained unmatched in the first period no new
information is generated, therefore pI(p̃) = p̃.
Proof of Proposition 1
Without limited liability the principal’s choice of investments and contract type maximizes
expected joint surplus in a match. Expected joint surplus with a young agent given optimal
investments is
E[πj+ui] = q[R(A, p̃)− c+ s∗(p̃)] + (q2 + (1− q)2)/2− F with a flexible contract,
E[πj+ui] = qR(A, p̃) + (1− q)R(B, p̃)− c+ s∗(p̃) + 1/2− F with rigid choice of a,
E[πj+ui] = 1/2− F with rigid choice of b.
Note first that F ≥ 1/2 implies that rigid choice of b is dominated. Comparing the first
two expressions, a flexible contract maximizes surplus if and only if c−q−s∗(p̃) ≥ R(B, p̃).
Furthermore, both expressions strictly increase in p̃ for p̃ ≤ p̄∗o and are positive at p̃ = p̄∗o,
but negative for p by Assumption (A3). Hence, there is a threshold expected productivity
p̄∗y < p̄
∗
o such that all young agents with p̃ ≥ p̄∗y are employed. The threshold p̄∗y is given
by R(A, p̄∗y) = c − s∗(p̄∗y) + F/q + 1 − q − 1/(2q) if R(B, p̄∗y) ≥ c − s∗(p̄∗y) − q and by
qR(A, p̄∗y) + (1− q)R(B, p̄∗y) = c− s∗(p̄∗y) + F − 1/2 otherwise.
A Mathematical Appendix 28
Proof of Proposition 2
Because s∗(p̃) attains a maximum at p̄∗o, rigid contracts will be used if c − q < s∗(p̄∗o) +
R(B, p̄∗o). Suppose this is the case. As both s∗(p̃) and R(B, p̃) increase in p̃ for p̃ < p̄∗o,
there is at most one p1 ∈ [p̄∗y, p̄∗o), such that c − q − s∗(p1) = R(B, p1). Because s∗(p̃)
approaches 0 as p̃ approaches p, a flexible contract is used for p̃ in the neighborhood of p.
Hence, there is at least one p2 ∈ (p̄∗o, p), such that c− q− s∗(p2) = R(B, p2). Because both
s∗(p̃) and R(B, p̃) are linear functions of p̃, there is at most one such p2. This implies that
c− q < s∗(p̄∗o) +R(B, p̄∗o) is also necessary for the use of rigid contracts.
Because pS(p̄∗o) > p̄∗o, it follows that
uo(pS(p̄
∗
o)) = q(R(A, pS(p̄
∗
o))− c) + (q2 + (1− q)2)− F > p̄∗ouo(p̄∗o) = 0
Hence, there are c > q sufficiently close to q and R(B, p̃) < 0 close enough to 0 for p̃ ∈ [p, p],
such that c− q −R(B, p̄∗o) < s∗(p̄∗o) = p̄∗ouo(pS(p̄∗o)), and a rigid contract will be used for a
young agent with p̃ = p̄∗o.
For the last statement in the proposition note that c−s∗(p̃) ≤ (1−q)R(B, p̃)+1/2 (the
condition that a rigid contract generates positive surplus) implies c − s∗(p̃) ≤ q + R(B, p̃)
(the condition that a rigid dominates a flexible contract) if 1/2 < q(1−R(B, p̃)).
Proof of Proposition 3
A principal who uses a flexible contract maximizes payoff
π = q(R(A, p̃o)− wa)− (1− q)wb − (k2a + k2b )/2− F,
subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality
wb + kb = wa − c+ ka and q(wa − c+ ka) + (1− q)(wb + kb) ≥ uo(p̃o).
As above the participation constraint must bind. Because marginal investment cost is zero
at ka = 0, compensating the agent in kind (increasing ka) is cheaper than using cash iff
ka < q. Because q < c, setting ka = q (which is efficient) and wa = uo(p̃o)+ c−q > 0 for all
uo(p̃o) ≥ 0. By contrast, kb = 1− q requires wb = uo(p̃o)− (1− q) ≥ 0, i.e. uo(p̃o) ≥ 1− q.
Otherwise kb = uo(p̃o) and wb = 0.
Consider now a rigid contract. Incentive compatibility and individual rationality require
wa − c+ ka ≥ wb + kb and wa − c+ ka ≥ uo(p̃o),
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The principal’s payoff is
π = qR(A, p̃o) + (1− q)R(B, p̃o)− c− wa − wb − (k2a + k2b )/2− F.
As above kb = 0, wb = 0 and the participation constraint binds. Efficient investment
(ka = 1) requires wa = uo(p̃o) + c − 1 ≥ 0, i.e. uo(p̃o) ≥ 1 − c. Otherwise ka = uo(p̃o) + c
and wa = 0.
Compare now the two contracts. Let uo(p̃o) < 1 − c first, implying uo(p̃o) < 1 − q. A
flexible contract is more profitable if
(1− q)c+ q2/2 + (1− q)uo(p̃o)−uo(p̃o)2/2 > (1− q)R(B, p̃o) + c+uo(p̃o)− (c+uo(p̃o))2/2.
After some rearranging this becomes
(c− q)2/2 + (c− q)uo(p̃o) > (1− q)R(B, p̃o),
which always holds, because the LHS is strictly positive and, by assumption, R(B, p̃o) < 0.
Let now 1− c < uo(p̃o) < 1− q. Then a flexible contract is more profitable if
(1− q)c+ q2/2 + (1− q)uo(p̃o)− uo(p̃o)2/2 > (1− q)R(B, p̃o) + 1/2.
This becomes
c− (1 + q)/2 + uo(p̃o)(1− uo(p̃o))/(2(1− q))) > R(B, p̃o).
Since 1 − c < uo(p̃o) < 1 − q by assumption, the LHS is bounded below by (c − q)/2 > 0.
The above condition is, therefore, always satisfied.
In case uo(p̃o) > 1− q the resulting condition coincides with the benchmark case. In all
possible cases, therefore, a flexible contract is preferred to a rigid one.
Finally, the second statement follows from computing expected payoffs at the optimal
investment levels and the condition that profits are non-negative.
Proof of Proposition 4
By Proposition 3 a principal j and an old agent o with p̃o have surplus πj + uo(p̃o) ≥ 0 if
πj = q(R(A, p̃o)− c) + q2/2 + (1− q)uo(p̃o)− uo(p̃o)2/2 ≥ F for 0 ≤ uo(p̃o) ≤ 1− q.
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Hence, supposing uo(.) weakly increases in p̃o, for πj + uo(p̃o) ≥ 0, p̃o must satisfy
p̃o ≥
c− q2 + F/q −R(A)
R(A)−R(A) .
Note that p̄o > p̄∗o, implying p̄o > p by Assumption (A3). Since the measure of principals
equals the one of all agents, old agents with pi ≥ p̄o are scarce. Therefore each principal
obtains payoff πj = 0 in equilibrium. This in turn implies that in a flexible contract
investments are efficient if uo(p̃o) ≥ 1− q, that is,
q(R(A, p̃o)− c) + (q2 + (1− q)2)/2− F ≥ 1− q.
Solving for p̃o yields
p̂o =
c− q + F/q −R(A) + 12q
R(A)−R(A) > p̄o. (8)
This allows computation of old agents’ equilibrium payoffs uo(p̃o) as an increasing function
of their expected productivity p̃o as given by expression (7) in the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 2
















As part (iii) requires p̃ to satisfy p̄o < pF (p̃) < p̂o, necessarily uo(pF (p̃)) > 0. Recalling that
pF (p̃) =
p̃(1−p−p)+pp
1−p̃ and using the definition of p̂o in (8) it is easily verified that pF (p̃) > p̄o
implies that p̃ > p̂o. Therefore uo(p̃) > 1− q by the definition of p̂o, and uo(pF (p̃)) > 0 as





and the derivative (9) is positive.
Proof of Lemma 3
The incentive compatibility constraint of a flexible contract requires
wa + s(p̃)− c+ ka = wb + kb.
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The agent’s participation constraint is given by
q(wa + s(p̃)− c+ ka) + (1− q)(wb + kb) ≥ uy(p̃). (10)
In principle, two cases could occur: (i) uy(p̃) < s(p̃)− c and the participation constraint
does not bind, and (ii) uy(p̃) ≥ s(p̃) − c and the participation constraint binds. Since
uy(p̃) is the equilibrium outside option, it must be that uy(p̃) ≥ s(p̃)− c, because an agent
employed in a firm must earn at least the payoff from a rigid contract implementing a
without monetary side payments nor investment in ka. This logic also applies to flexible
contracts, as the agent must be indifferent between the two tasks. Hence, the participation
constraint must bind for both contract types.
The principal’s payoff is
π = q(R(A, p̃)− wa)− (1− q)wb − (k2a + k2b )/2− F. (11)
Also here, it is cheaper to transfer utility in kind rather than use cash whenever ka < q and
kb < 1− q. This means that
wa=0, ka=uy(p̃)+c−s(p̃), wb = 0, kb = uy(p̃) if uy(p̃)+c−s(p̃)<q
wa=uy(p̃)+c−s(p̃)−q, ka=q, wb=uy(p̃)−(1−q), kb=1−q otherwise.
(12)
Under a rigid contract implementing a incentive compatibility and individual rationality
require
wa + s(p̃)− c+ ka ≥ wb + kb and wa + s(p̃)− c+ ka ≥ uy(p̃).
The principal’s payoff is
π = qR(A, p̃) + (1− q)R(B, p̃)− wa − (k2a + k2b )/2− F.
Therefore the principal optimally sets kb = 0 and wb = 0. Analogously to a flexible contract,
in-kind transfers in the form of the investment ka are less costly than cash payments if
ka < 1, as in the case of old agents. Therefore,
wa = 0 and ka = c− s(p̃) + uy(p̃) if c− s(p̃) + uy(p̃) ≤ 1,
wa = c− s(p̃) + uy(p̃)− 1 and ka = 1 otherwise.
(13)
Rigid contracts emphasize investment in A capital and do not provide B capital. They
rely on implicit incentives (i.e. the signal value) to reward employees for working on task a,
providing A capital and monetary rewards only to agents with high enough outside options.
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To determine the choice of contract type several cases need to be distinguished.
Suppose uy(p̃) < s(p̃)− c+ q first. Then wa = 0 in both contracts and a rigid contract




< (1− q)R(B, p̃) if uy(p̃) ≤ 1− q
1− q
2
− uy(p̃) < R(B, p̃) if uy(p̃) > 1− q.
That is, a flexible contract is preferable if uy(p̃) < s(p̃)− c+ q and
uy(p̃) < û(p̃) =:
{
(1− q)/2−R(B, p̃) if − 2R(B, p̃) ≥ 1− q√
2(1− q)(−R(B, p̃) otherwise.
(14)
Turn now to the case s(p̃) − c + q ≤ uy(p̃) ≤ s(p̃) + 1 − c. Surplus is higher under a
flexible than under a rigid contract if
q(s(p̃)− c) + q
2
2
− uy(p̃) + (1− q)kb −
k2b
2




Solving for s(p̃) yields a quadratic equation. Its determinant is positive if, and only if,
uy(p̃) ≥ û(p̃); otherwise the condition that a flexible contract is preferable always holds.
Supposing uy(p̃) ≥ û(p̃) the condition becomes
s(p̃) < ŝ(uy(p̃)) :=uy(p̃)+c−q−
{√
2(1− q)(uy(p̃)+R(B, p̃)−(1− q)/2) if uy(p̃)≥1−q√
(uy(p̃)2+2(1−q)R(B, p̃)) otherwise.
(15)
This defines a function ŝ(uy(p̃)) for uy(p̃) ≥ û(p̃) and ŝ(uy(p̃)) + q− c ≤ uy(p̃) ≤ ŝ(uy(p̃)) +
1− c. Since ŝ(uy(p̃)) ≤ uy(p̃) + c− q holds for the expression above, only the upper bound
has a bite and becomes
(1− q)2 − 2(1− q)R(B, p̃) ≥
{
2(1− q)(uy(p̃)− (1− q)/2) if uy(p̃) ≥ 1−q
uy(p̃)
2 otherwise.
Because (1 − q)2 − 2(1 − q)R(B, p̃) > (1 − q)2, the condition ŝ(uy(p̃)) + q − c ≤ uy(p̃) ≤
ŝ(uy(p̃)) + 1− c holds if and only if û(p̃) ≤ uy(p̃) ≤ 1− q −R(B, p̃). Differentiating yields
that ŝ(uy(p̃)) is strictly decreasing on this interval.
Finally, let uy(p̃) > s(p̃) + 1− c. A flexible contract is now profitable if
q(s(p̃)− c) + q
2
2
+ (1− q)kb −
k2b
2
> (1− q)R(B, p̃)− c+ s(p̃) + 1/2.
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That is, if
s(p̃) < c−R(B, p̃)−
{
q if uy(p̃) ≥ 1− q
((1 + q)/2− uy(p̃) + uy(p̃)2/(2(1− q))) otherwise.
This defines ŝ(uy(p̃)) for uy(p̃) > 1−q−R(B, p̃), because by assumption ŝ(uy(p̃))−uy(p̃)−
c+ 1 < 0, which in turn becomes 1− uy(p̃)−R(B, p̃) < q, as (1− q)2 − 2(1− q)R(B, p̃) <
uy(p̃)
2 < (1− q)2 yields a contradiction. That is,
ŝ(uy(p̃)) = c− q −R(B, p̃) > 0 (16)
for uy(p̃) > 2(1− q −R(B, p̃)).
Surplus efficiency follows directly from the characteristics of the optimal contracts (12)
and (13). This establishes the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4
Using π = 0, (12), and (11), the equilibrium payoff uy(p̃) of a young agent with expected




qR(A, p̃)−F−(c−s(p̃))2/4−(c−s(p̃))/2 if uy(p̃)<1− q, q+s(p̃)−c√
2q(R(A, p̃)+s(p̃)−c+q)−2F−q if q+s(p̃)−c<uy(p̃)<1−q√
2[(1−q)(1− q+c−s(p̃))+qR(A, p̃)−F ]−1+s(p̃)−c+q if 1−q<uy(p̃)<q+s(p̃)−c
q(R(A, p̃)−c+s(p̃)+q/2)+(1−q)2/2− F if uy(p̃)>1−q, q+s(p̃)−c.
Under a rigid contract,
uy(p̃) =
{ √
2(qR(A, p̃) + (1− q)R(B, p̃)− F )− c+ s(p̃)) if E[R(s, p̃)] < 1/2
qR(A, p̃) + (1− q)R(B, p̃)− c+ s(p̃) + 1/2− F if E[R(s, p̃)] ≥ 1/2.
Establish first that uy(p̃) strictly increases in p̃ when implementing task a at least some
of the time. For this we need that ∂s(p̃)∂p̃ > −[R(A) − R(A)], which is easily verified using
the definitions of s(p̃) and uo(p̃), which increases in p̃ as does pS(p̃). In all cases the first
derivative of uy(p̃) with respect to p̃ is positive.
To check which of the above cases holds for uy(p̄y) = 0, note first that uy(p̄y) < 1 − q
so that kb = uy(p̄y). Moreover, s(p̄y) ≤ c. Suppose otherwise, then the agent’s payoff in
the firm is at least s(p̄y)− c > 0. But then there is p̃ < p̄y such that s(p̃)− c > 0. Hence,
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uy(p̄y) = 0 and s(p̄y) > c cannot both hold. Hence, either uy(p̄y) < 1− q, q + s(p̄y)− c or
q + s(p̄y)− c < uy(p̄y) < 1− q must be the case. Setting uy(p̄y) = 0 then yields
R(A, p̄y) = F/q + (c− s(p̄y))2/(2q) if s(p̄y) > c− q and
R(A, p̄y) = c− s(p̄y) + F/q − q/2 otherwise.
This implies p̄y > p̄o given by (6), since R(A, p̄o) = c− q/2 + F/q, with a strict inequality
as s(p̄o) > 0. It also implies that s(p̄y) = p̄yuo(pS(p̄y)), ensuring that s(p̃) increases at p̄y.
Using the definition of s(p̃) yields the cutoff productivity in terms of the primitives.
Proof of Proposition 5
The cutoff values p̄o and p̄y have been established above. A rigid contract is preferable
for productivity p̃ if, and only if, s(p̃) ≥ ŝ(uy(p̃)). By Lemma 4 the optimal contract for
young agents with p̃ ≥ p̄y in the neighborhood of p̄y is flexible. Hence, there is p1 ∈ (p̄y, p],
such that flexible contracts are optimal for py ≤ p̃ ≤ p1. Clearly, limp̃→p s(p̃) = 0, while
ŝ(uy(p̃)) > 0 as defined in the proof of Lemma 3. Therefore there is p4 ∈ [p̄y, p), such that
flexible contracts are optimal for p4 ≤ p̃ ≤ p.
Next we derive a sufficient condition for existence of rigid contracts (i.e. p̄y < p1 <
p4 < p). To do so we focus on p̄o where s(p̃) attains a maximum. A rigid contract is
desirable for p̄o if uy(p̄o) > û(p̄o) and s(p̄o) > ŝ(uy(p̄o)). Using the definition of ŝ(uy(p̃))
in the proof of Lemma 3, a sufficient condition for the second is s(p̄o) ≥ uy(p̄o) + c − q.
Because uo(p̄o) = 0 and ka = q for the old agent, it follows that uy(p̄o) ≥ s(p̄o) + q − c iff
s(p̄o) + q− c ≥
√
2q(c− q). Hence, for c− q sufficiently small s(p̄o) > ŝ(uy(p̄o)). Note that
s(p̄o) + q − c >
√
2q(c− q) implies uy(p̄o) >
√
2q(c− q).
uy(p̄o) > û(p̄o) holds if
uy(p̄o) >
{
(1− q)/2−R(B, p̄o)/q if − 2R(B, p̄o) ≥ 1− q√




2q(c− q), for any c > q there is a function R(B, p̃) with |R(B, p̃)| <
(1− q)/2 small enough for all p̃ such that the above condition is satisfied.
That is, if effort cost c and expected revenue of task b, R(B, p̃) for all p̃ are close enough
to q and to 0, respectively, there is a productivity p̄y < p̄o < p such that a young agent
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with that productivity receives a rigid contract. If ŝ(uy(p̃)) is convex this implies that ŝ(p̃)
and s(p̃) intersect twice at most. Otherwise, there may be more intersection points.
For flexible contracts kb = min{1 − q;uy(p̃)}. Therefore 0 < kb ≤ 1 − q for p̃ > p̄y.
Rigid contracts (with kb = 0) are optimal only if s(p̃) > ŝ(p̃), implying uy(p̃) + c− s(p̃) > q
(see proof of Lemma 3). Hence, q < ka ≤ 1 in rigid contracts. For s(p̃) < ŝ(p̃) a flexible
contract is optimal, with ka = min{uy(p̃) + c − s(p̃); q}. Since uy(p̃) + c − s(p̃) > q for




∂p̃ for q > 1/2, uy(p̃) + c− s(p̃) > q and ka = q for p̃ > p2.
Finally, a sufficient condition for rigid contracts not to occur is s(p̃) < c− q − R(B, p̃)
for all [p̄o, p]. This is implied by s(p̄o) < c− q −R(B, p̄o).
Details for Corollary 1
For the statements on employment, note that p̄o > p̄∗o by Proposition 4. To show that also
p̄y > p̄
∗
y requires some work. Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that




+ 1− q − 1
2q
.
The weak inequality is due to assuming that a flexible contract is used for p̄∗y, which may
not be optimal (e.g., when q ≥ 1/2). Recall from the proof of Lemma 4 that also






The inequality is strict if q > c− s(p̄y). Moreover, s∗(p) > s(p) for p < p̄o, since no limited












implies that indeed p̄∗y < p̄y.
Distortions in corporate investment follow from Proposition 3 for old agents and from
Lemma 3 for young agents. Distortions in contractual choice for young agents for q ≥ 1/2
follow from Propositions 2 and 5.
B Large, Heterogeneous Firms: Benchmark Case
Suppose that a firm hires two workers with expected productivities p̃1 and p̃2, signal values
s1 and s2, and outside options u1 and u2. This setup encompasses arrangements where a
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young and an old agent, with s1 > 0 and s2 = 0, form a team. To illustrate the mechanics
let us focus on the benchmark case without limited liability. There are three cases: the
firm uses (i) only rigid contracts, (ii) only flexible contracts, or (iii) different contracts.
Case (i). Incentive compatibility and individual rationality require
wia + si − c+ ka ≥ wib + kb and wia + si − c+ ka ≥ ui.
The principal’s payoff is
π = q(R(A, p̃1) +R(A, p̃2)) + (1− q)(R(B, p̃1) +R(B, p̃2))− w1a − w2a − (k2a + k2b )/2− F.
Hence, kb = 0 and wib = 0, and w
i
a = ui − si + c− ka. This in turn means that joint profit
is maximized if ka = 2. Joint surplus is thus
u1 + u2 + π = q(R(A, p̃1) +R(A, p̃2)) + (1− q)(R(B, p̃1) +R(B, p̃2))− 2c+ s1 + s2 + 1−F.
Case (ii). Incentive compatibility and individual rationality require
wia + si − c+ ka = wib + kb and wia + si − c+ ka ≥ ui.
The principal’s payoff is
π = q(R(A, p̃1) +R(A, p̃2)− w1a − w2a)− (1− q)(w1b + w2b )− (k2a + k2b )/2− F.
Hence, wia = ui − si + c − ka and wib = ui − kb. This in turn means that joint profit is
maximized if ka = 2q and kb = 2(1− q). Joint surplus is thus
u1 + u2 + π = q(R(A, p̃1) +R(A, p̃2)− 2c+ s1 + s2) + 2q2 + 2(1− q)2 − F.
Case (iii). Suppose that worker 1 receives a rigid contract and worker 2 are flexible one
(implying that s1 > s2). Then incentive compatibility and individual rationality require
w1a + s1 − c+ ka ≥ w1b + kb and w2a + s2 − c+ ka = w2b + kb and wia + si − c+ ka ≥ ui.
The principal’s payoff is
π = q(R(A, p̃1) +R(A, p̃2)− w2a) + (1− q)(R(B, p̃1)− w2b )− w1a − (k2a + k2b )/2− F.
Therefore wia = ui − si + c − ka and wib ≤ ui − kb. Using this on the firm’s profit yields
optimal investments ka = 1 + q and kb = 1− q. Joint surplus is thus
π = q(R(A, p̃1) +R(A, p̃2)− c+ s2) + (1− q)R(B, p̃1) + s1 − c− u1 − u2 + 1 + q2 − F.
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That is, depending on workers’ types one of three contracting regimes will be chosen,
differing significantly and discretely in the corporate investment composition. E.g., in a
match of an old (s2 = 0) and a young (s1 > 0) agent a mixed dominates a pure rigid regime
if
c− q − 1 > R(B, p̃2) = R+ p̃2(R−R).
The mixed regime dominates a pure flexible regime if
c− q − (2q − 1) < R(B, p̃1) + s1.
Hence, if an intermediate old agent teams up with a similarly productive, high signal value
young agent, the old agent will have more flexibility in the task chosen and a higher part
of the salary will be independent of the task. Corporate infrastructure investments will be
geared towards A capital, with ka > kb > 0.
References
Bebchuk, Lucian A and Fried, Jesse M: 2009, ‘Pay without performance: The unfulfilled
promise of executive compensation’. Harvard University Press.
Bloom, N. and Van Reenen, J.: 2007, ‘Measuring and explaining management practices
across firms and countries’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4), 1351–1408.
Canidio, A. and P. Legros: 2017, ‘Learning Within or Outside Firms? Labor Market
Frictions and Entrepreneurship’. Working Paper.
Gall, T.: 2010, ‘Inequality, Incomplete Contracts, and the Size Distribution of Business
Firms’. International Economic Review 51(2), 335–364.
Gibbons, R.: 2010, ‘Inside organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence’. Annual
Review of Economics 2, 337–365.
Gibbons, R. and R. Holden, and M. Powell: 2012, ‘Organization and Information: Firms’
Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium’. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 127(4), 1813–1841.
Gibbons, R. and K. J. Murphy: 1992, ‘Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of
Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence’. Journal of Political Economy 100(3), 468–505.
B Large, Heterogeneous Firms: Benchmark Case 38
Harris, M. and B. Holmström: 1982, ‘A Theory of Wage Dynamics’. Review of Economic
Studies 49, 315–333.
Harstad, B.: 2007, ‘Organizational Form and the Market for Talent’. Journal of Labor
Economics 25(3), 581–611.
Hermalin, B. E.: 1993, ‘Managerial Preferences Concerning Risky Projects’. Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization 9(1), 127–135.
Hirshleifer, D. and A. V. Thakor: 1992, ‘Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice, and
Debt’. Review of Financial Studies 5(3), 437–470.
Holmström, B.: 1999, ‘Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective’. Review of
Economic Studies 66(1), 169–182.
Holmström, B. and P. Milgrom: 1991, ‘Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Con-
tracts, asset Ownership, and Job Design’. Journal of Law Economics and Organization
7(1), 24–52.
Holmström, B. and J. Ricart i Costa: 1986, ‘Managerial Incentives and Capital Manage-
ment’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(4), 835–860.
Jensen, Michael C: 1986, ‘Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers’.
The American economic review 323–329.
Kaarbøe, O. M. and T. E. Olsen: 2006, ‘Career Concerns, Monetary Incentives and Job
Design’. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108(2), 299–316.
Kolstad, J. T.: 2013, ‘Information and quality when motivation is intrinsic: evidence from
surgeon report cards’. American Economic Review, 103(7), 2875–2910.
Kvaløy, O. and A. Schöttner: 2015, ‘Incentives to Motivate’. Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, 116, 26–42.
Legros, P. and A. Newman: 2013, ‘A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(2), 725–770.
Marino, A. M. and J. Zábojník: 2008, ‘Work-related Perks, Agency Problems, and Optimal
Incentive Problems’. RAND Journal of Economics 39(2), 565–585.
B Large, Heterogeneous Firms: Benchmark Case 39
Milbourn, T. T., R. L. Shockley, and A. V. Thakor: 2001, ‘Managerial Career Concerns
and Investments in Information’. RAND Journal of Economics 32(2), 334–351.
Narayanan, M. P.: 1985, ‘Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results’. Journal of Finance
40(5), 1469–1484.
Oyer, P.: 2008, ‘Salary or Benefits?’. Research in Labor Economics 28, 429–467.
Orentlicher, D.: 1996, ‘Paying physicians more to do less: financial incentives to limit care’.
University of Richmond Law Review 30.
Perlow, L. A. and J. L. Porter: 2009, ‘Making Time Off Predictable and Required’. Harvard
Business Review 87(10), 102–109.
Pitchik, Carolyn: 2008, ‘Self-Promoting Investments’. Journal of Institutional and Theo-
retical Economics 164(3), 381–406.
Rajan, R. G. and J. Wulf: 2006, ‘Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?’. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics 79.
Rosen, S.: 1986, ‘The Theory of Equalizing Differences’. In: Handbook of Labor Economics,
Vol. I. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 641–692.
Scharfstein, D. and J. Stein: 1990, ‘Herd Behavior and Investment’. American Economic
Review 80(3), 465–479.
Tamada, Y. and T. Tsai: 2018, ‘Reputation versus information: The delegation policy when
the principal has reputational concerns’. Journal of Public Economic Theory 20(3), 367–
389.
Terviö, M.: 2009 ‘Superstars and Mediocrities: Market Failure in the Discovery of Talent’.
The Review of Economic Studies 76(2), 829–850.
Varkevisser, M. and S. A. van der Geest and F. Schut: 2012, ‘Do patients choose hospitals
with high quality ratings? Empirical evidence from the market for angioplasty in the
Netherlands’. Journal of Health Economics 31, 371–378.
